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Conquerors, Peacekeepers, or Both?
The U.S. Army and West Florida, 1810-1811,
A New Perspective
by Samuel Watson
he Louisiana Purchase did not remove Spanish posts along
the east bank of the Mississippi River. These posts could
still choke off commerce at New Orleans, and American
leaders immediately began pressing Spain to cede West Florida.
Spain rejected U.S. demands, Napoleon refused to compel its
acquiescence, and U.S . .officials became increasingly belligerent.
The commanding general of the U.S. Army, Brigadier GeneralJam es
Wilkinson, repeatedly sought permission to seize West Florida, an
area that included the eastern parishes of Louisiana and parts of
present day Mississippi, Alabama and Florida. President Jefferson's
reluctance to mobilize an adequate force precluded military action
throughout his administration, while diplomatic feelers to Spanish
colonial officials proved inconclusive.
Meanwhile, American
adventurers, criminals, and army deserters aggravated instability
in West Florida, while Spanish colonial officials lost legitimacy,
direction, and the prospect of reinforcement when Napoleon
invaded Spain. In 1810 many settlers joined together to rebel
and declare their independence. The United States intervened,
the army occupied West Florida, and the region was annexed to
Louisiana, but filibusters-private individuals invading another
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nation's territory, contrary to U.S. law-and eventually elements
of the army itself, besieged the Spanish fort at Mobile during the
winter of 1810 and 1811, until Brigadier General Wade Hampton
ordered the army to tum from threatening Spain to repressing
filibusters and bandits.
Despite a wave of recent scholarship about the West Florida
revolution, the West Florida republic, and its absorption into the
United States, historians have not closely examined the role of the
U.S. Army in the Louisiana-Florida borderland before the War of
1812. Recent work, including the Fall 2011 special issue of the
Florida Historical Quarterly and books by William C. Davis and Andrew
McMichael, focused on the inhabitants of West Florida and their
economic institutions, social relations, and political culture. Other
scholars have assayed national-level diplomacy. While the roles of
the leading American civil officials, particularly President Madison
and Louisiana territorial governor William C. C. Claiborne, have
been thoroughly scrutinized, the source of their physical power
to occupy and annex West Florida, the national standing army,
has not been discussed in depth since the early 1970s. Nor have
the army's operations around Mobile at the end of 1810 and the
beginning of 1811, which threatened international peace as much
as the West Florida revolution, received much attention. Even
Davis, who studies the military and diplomatice aspects of the
period, approaches this crisis from the perspective of expansionism
in general, embodied in Claiborne's correspondence. No existing
account satisfactorily explains the reasons the army backed away
from attacking the Spanish fort at Mobile, which might have
precipitated British intervention and wider conflict eighteen
months before the outbreak of the War of 1812. 1
1.

Florida Historical Quarterly 90, no. 2 (Fall 2011); William C. Davis, The R.ogue
Republic: How Would-Be Patriots Waged the Shortest Revolution in American History
(New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011); Andrew McMichael, Atlantic
Loyalties: Americans in Spanish West Florida, 1785-1810 (Athens: University of
Georgia Press, 2008). See also David A. Bice, The Original Lone Star Republic:
Scoundrels, Statesmen, and Schemers of the 1810 West Florida Rebellion (Clanton,
AL: Heritage Publishing Consultants, 2004); and Stanley C. Arthur, The
Story of the West Florida Rebellion (St. Francisville, LA.: St. Francisville Democrat,
1935). Despite doing extraordinary research, Davis does not employ the War
Department letters and reports held by the National Archives, and cannot
satisfactorily interpret army actions. Given the limits of space, this essay
will not address the process by or reasons for which settlers in West Florida
rebelled, which have been thoroughly investigated in recent scholarship; the
best short summary of the politics of the West Florida Convention and the
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revolt is Samuel C. Hyde, "Consolidating the Revolution: Faction and Finesse in
the West Florida Revolt, 1810," Louisiana History 51 (Summer 2010): 261-283.
The most comprehensive treatment of U.S. policy and action toward
West Florida remains Isaac]. Cox, The West Florida Controversy, 1790-1813: A
Study in American Dip!mnacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1918).
Wanjohi Waciuma, Intervention in the Spanish Floridas, 1801-1813: A Study in
Jeffersonian Foreign Policy (Boston: Branden Press, 1976), chapters 5-6, provides
a summary from the standpoint of national policy and international relations
The best short summary of the revolt and crisis as a whole remains Thomas P.
Abernethy, The South in the New Nation, 1789-1819 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1961), chapter 13. The best short account from the
presidential level is]. C. A. Stagg, Jeanne Kerr Cross, and Susan Holbrooke
Perdue, eds., The Papers of James Madison, Presidential Series (Charlottesville:
University Press of Virginia, 1992) (hereafter PJM), "Editorial Note," 2:305320; this account is augmented in JC.A. Stagg, Borderlines in Borderlands:
James Madison and the Spanish-American Frontier, 1776-1821 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2009), chapter 2, but Stagg is almost exclusively concerned
with the character and degree of the Madison administration's involvement
in the West Florida revolution. Pages 82-86 discuss American machinations
against Mobile, but stop at the beginning of December 1811, before U.S.
forces directly threatened the Spanish fort. Frank L. Owsley, Jr., and Gene
A. Smith, Filibusters and Expansionists: Jeffersonian Manifest Destiny, 1800-1821
(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1997), chapter 3, presents a more
critical, and ultimately more persuasive, interpretation of Madison's policies.
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This essay will explore the crucial, perhaps decisive role of
the U .S. Army, so often considered insignificant during the era
of the early republic, in repressing the revolution and annexing
West Florida to the United States and in pressuring Spain over
Mobile during the winter ofl810-ll. This case study demonstrates
the army's dual role as peacekeeper and conqueror. It also helps
explain the outcome of the unrest, as the army provided the muscle
behind Madison's proclamation of annexation, then threatened
and nearly attacked the Spanish fort at Mobile at the end of the
year, before the general in command, Wade Hampton, finally
reined in his subordinates. The essay reconciles the apparent
paradoxes of this role by examining the legal, constitutional, and
political dilemmas posed by the officer's institutional position
and interests, as well as the dangers and dilemmas of American
expansionism amid the world war between Britain and France.
Outside Mobile, we see army officers, some as junior as captains,
playing crucial roles in policy interpretation and execution as
men on the spot, without "rules of engagement" to guide them.
Using the extensive discretion necessitated by long distances and
difficult communications, they nearly precipitated, but ultimately
prevented, international war. 2

2.

Tommy R. Young II, "The United States Army in the South, 1789-1835" (PhD
diss., Louisiana State University, 1973) , 22&-237, a fine work unfortunately
unpublished, provides the only existing narrative account of army operations
rooted in official correspondence. The crisis is mentioned on a single page in
Francis Paul Prucha, The Sword of the Repuhlic: The United States Army on the Frontier,
1783-1846 (New York: Macmillan, 1969), and not at all in James Ripley Jacobs,
The Beginning of the US. Army, 1783-1812 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1947), the only general works examining the army during these years. Waciuma,
187-188, mentions the U.S. military threat against Mobile and Hampton 's
decision to back away, but attributes the action to Claiborne and the militia.
Despite his stated interest in governance, McMichael, Atlantic Loyalties, discusses
the army in regard to deserters and as filibusters before 1810, but does not
examine its actions around Mobile early in 1811.
Cody Scallions, "The Rise and Fall of the Original Lone Star State: Infant
American Imperialism Ascendant in West Florida,'' Florida Historical Quarterly
90, no. 2 (Fall 2011): 193-220, delineates the process of the U.S. occupation
step-by-step (21&-218), but like most accounts focused on the revolution, his
does not address the filibusters against Mobile after the U .S. annexation, or
army operations with and against them. I will refer to the expeditions by West
Floridians against Spanish garrisons as filibusters, though only the forays from
Mississippi against Mobile fit that definition precisely. However, filibuster is
much more accurate, from the standpoint of U.S. and international law, than
describing these armed men as settlers, militia, volunteers, or citizen-soldiers.
Scallions is notably optimistic about the future of an independent West
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In that process, we see an intermediate level of policy
formation, diplomacy, and "foreign relations," between the formal
inter-state negotiations of ministers in national capitals and the
"local diplomacy" of West Floridians pursuing their own interests
in the international arena. Combining the regional diplomacy of
William C. C. Claiborne-a federal governor who saw himself as
a representative of American settlers in the southwest-with the
efforts of federal military officers, more localized in space around
Mobile, but perhaps more national and more statist in objectives
and orientation, we can identify a fuller spectrum oflocal, regional,
and international interests and relations. In doing so, we restore
agency to the actual executors of national policy, in addition to
national-level policymakers like the president and non-state actors
like the West Florida rebels and filibusters against Mobile, and
observe governance in its most direct and unmediated form, the
threat and use of force. This in turn helps us recognize the toooften neglected or denigrated role of the national state, particularly
the executive branch and most specifically the national army, even
in the pre-professional era ofJames Wilkinson. Lastly, even though
the sources and protagonists are American, a reexamination of the
West Florida revolt as an international crisis rather than a socially,
economically, or ideologically rooted revolution can restore
some sense of the motives and agency of the Spanish officials
who stubbornly and valiantly resisted American aggression while
outnumbered and cut off from substantial reinforcement. 3

3.

Florida, but does not address the likelihood of Spanish or British reactions, or
the lawlessness that McMichael and Davis delineate; he appears to exaggerate
the extent of Convention opposition to U.S. annexation, citing only one
individual apart from Fulwar Skipwith.
In most recent accounts Spanish officials like West Florida governor Vicente
Folch appear merely as foils for American demands, or in relation to the
West Florida settlers, aggravating or ameliorating their grievances, rather
than independent actors or factors in the outcome. Indeed, by focusing so
closely on explaining Madison's policies,]. C. A. Stagg often presents Madison's
perspective with little caveat, using language that portrays Spain as a problem
for the United States and its president to solve, rather than a victim of American
greed and aggression. The concept of "local diplomacy" is articulated in
Peter]. Kastor, The Nation's Crucibl,e: The Louisiana Purchase and the Creation of
America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004) , and Kastor, '"Mo tives of
Peculiar Urgency': Local Diplomacy in Louisiana, 1803-1821,"William and Mary
Quarterly 58 (October 2001): 819-848. The concept is valuable, but Kastor
presents it as a replacement for, rather than a complement to or another
dimension of, international relations as a whole. Thus he has Claiborne
playing the leading role in the "Neutral Ground" agreement to demilitarize
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The army's garrisons were small in absolute terms-less than a
thousand soldiers total, and less than a hundred during the initial
crisis at Mobile-but potent in comparison with those they faced in
the principal population centers in Alabama and Florida north and
west of Mobile during the fall of 1810. The army's officers included
high-ranking, experienced veterans like James Wilkinson, a master
of diplomacy and intrigue and the army's de facto commanding
general between 1797 and 1808, and Wilkinson's successor on the
scene, the recently commissioned Wade Hampton, a fabulously
wealthy and equally imperious South Carolina planter. The leading
players on the spot were Hampton's highly experienced second in
command, cautious Colonel Thomas Cushing; versatile, energetic
Captain Edmund P. Gaines, who had spent nearly a decade at Fort
Stoddert on the Tombigbee River thirty miles north of Mobile; and
volatile Lieutenant Colonel Richard Sparks, the commander at
Stoddert and a veteran of twenty years dealing with citizens on the
southern frontier. The soldiers they led were primarily regulars,
not territorial militia or volunteers, who cost significantly more per
soldier due to supply wastage, posed greater disciplinary problems,
and were available for much shorter periods of enlistment. 4

4.

the area between the Sabine and the Arroyo Hondo in 1806, which is simply
incorrect: James Wilkinson was the commander of the American military forces;
territorial governors Claiborne and Holmes deferred to him as such, and it was
Wilkinson who negotiated with the Spanish commander. Used in this manner,
"local diplomacy" becomes another way of asserting the agency of previously
neglected actors, like the Caddo Indians-to whom Kastor devotes more space, and
apparently thinks more powerful, than the U.S. Army-but errs in the assessment
of power relations. Jay Gitlin, "Private Diplomacy to Private Property: States,
Tribes, and Nations in the Early National Period," Diplmnatic Histury 22 (Winter
1998): 85-99, and William Earl Weeks, "New Directions in the Study of Early
American Foreign Relations," Diplmnatic History 17 (Winter 1993): 73-95, advocate
greater attention to non-state actors and "men on the spot" in early American
foreign relations, anticipating Kastor's concept, without downplaying the agency
of national actors. R. E. Robinson and J. A. Gallagher, Afaca and the Victorians:
The Official Mind of Imperialism (London: Macmillan, 1961) pioneered similar
approaches in British imperial history; see John Danvin, "Imperialism and the
Victorians: The Dynamics of Territorial Expansion," English Historical Review 112
(June 1997): 634-640, for a more recent variant
Historians commonly mistake citizen-soldiers and regulars, the militia and
the national standing army, for one another. For example McMichael, 60,
asserts that Wilkinson and Claiborne occupied New Orleans at the end of 1803
solely with militia. Instead, 200 Mississippi militia supported 300 regulars in
the initial occupation of New Orleans that December; see the enclosures in
Wilkinson, January 3, 1804, file W-189, Office of the Secretary of War, Letters
Received, Registered Series (hereafter cited as SWLR:Reg., with the author
only unless the addressee was not the secretary of war), Record Group 107,
National Archives.
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During the summer of 1810 Napoleon appeared dominant in
Central Europe, but his struggle with Britain and Spain remained in
doubt. The future of Spain's colonies in the Americas was uncertain,
nor was it clear whether Spanish colonial officials could expect
military aid from Britain in case of rebellion or U.S. aggression.
Reports of disaffection among the settlers of West Florida appeared
in the eastern newspapers, and an April letter asserted that ''West
Florida will in less than two months, throw themselves under the
protection of the U. States." Such unrest, combined with rebellions in
Mexico and Venezuela and rumors that Spanish America would seek
independence, encouraged renewed U.S. belligerence toward West
Florida, even amid tensions over British aggression against U.S. sailors
and commerce. In contrast to the self-imposed isolation ofJefferson's
Embargo and the import and export restrictions that followed, fears
of British or French intrigue, or the formation of pro-British or proFrench parties among the settlers that might invite intervention,
spurred U.S. government action toward Florida. On June 14, 1810
Claiborne wrote from Washington D.C., where he had been meeting
with Madison, to Louisiana parish judge and militia commander
William Wykoff, explicitly requesting that Wykoff stimulate disaffection
in West Florida and seek U.S. intervention, preferably through
a convention of the inhabitants.
Madison himself suggested that
Secretary of State Robert Smith "apprize Govr. H [olmes, of Mississippi
Territory], confidentially, of the course adopted as to W. F. ... to have
his co-operation in diffusing the impressions we wish to be made
there." (Remember that the State Department was responsible for the
government of federal territories.) After a decade of vain hopes that
Napoleon would compel Spain to surrender the Floridas,Jeffersonian
expansion was set to march. 5
5.

"Extract of a letter from a Gentleman in N. Orleans," dated April 25, The
National Intelligencer and Washington Advertiser, June 20, Gale Nineteenth
Century American Newspapers online database (http:/ / 0-infotrac.galegroup.
com.usmalibrary.usma.edu/ itw/ infomark / 0/ l / 1/ purl=rc6_NCNP?sw_
aep=west10360, (accessed 25 June 2013); Claiborne to Wykoff, June 14, in
Dunbar Rowland, ed., Official Letter Books of W. C. C. Claiborne, 1801-1816
Qackson, MS.: State Department of Archives and History, 1917) (hereafter
cited as LBWCCC), 5: 31-34; Secretary of State Robert Smith to Wykoff, and
to William H. Crawford, June 20, in Clarence Edwin Carter, ed., Territorial
Papers of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1937) (hereafter cited as TP), 9: 883-85; Madison to Smith,July 17, PJM,2: 419.
John R. Maass, '" Humanity mourns over Such a Site': The Army's Disaster at
Terre aux Boeufs, 1809," Army History 85 (Fall 2012): 7-25, presents the most
recent examination of that disaster. All documents cited herein are from 1810,
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The disenchanted inhabitants of West Florida had anticipated
the Madison administration's maneuvers, first calling an election
for convention delegates on June 23, weeks before Claiborne's letter
could reach Wykoff. Three weeks later, Richard Sparks reported
from Fort Stoddert on the growing movement for a convention
that would seek West Florida's independence or autonomy from
Spain. Spanish officials had alerted the colonel to the existence of
a "Mobile Society," dedicated to the capture of that port, among the
brash American frontiersmen settled around Stoddert. Although
most U.S. officials assumed that rebels would seek annexation,
Sparks blamed "turbulent, ambitious men"-terms we shall see
might be applied to Sparks himself-for the clamor, and professed
concern that the filibuster society might attempt to seize the military
stores at his thinly garrisoned fort, to supply themselves and forestall
U.S. intervention against them. This danger, combined with the
continual desertion of soldiers who might join the filibusters, despite
a proclamation of amnesty for desertion earlier in the year, caused
the colonel to request reinforcement. Edmund Gaines, a veteran
captain with nearly a decade's service in what later became Alabama,
echoed his commander's concerns later in July, reporting toasts by
the men led by Joseph Kennedy, a leader of the filibuster "Mobile
Society," to federal district court judge Harry Toulmin (who was in
fact Gaines's father-in-law). Madison anticipated these contingencies
on July 17, ordering the secretary of state to have Mississippi governor
David Holmes mobilize his militia for intervention against "foreign
interference" or "internal convulsions" in West Florida. On August
10, Madison instructed Secretary of War William Eustis to ensure that
U.S. neutrality law was upheld; Sparks was to collect evidence for any
prosecutions. Eustis also forwarded these orders to Brigadier General
Wade Hampton, commanding at New Orleans during Wilkinson's
absence due to his court-martial in the east, and to Hampton's de
facto chief of staff, Colonel Thomas Cushing, though the secretary's
letter generated confusion about the forces to be employed. 6

6.

unless otherwise indicated. PJM, 2: 505-506, note 2, indicates that Wykoff did
go to St. John 's, and attended the elections for delegates to the convention
that came to rule West Florida during the revolution. See Madison to Smith,
July 17, PJM, 2: 419, for Madison's orders to ensure Holmes ' "cooperation in
diffusing the impressions we wish to have made" in West Florida.
Stagg, 60; Sparks,July 12, file S-168, and Gaines to Toulmin, July 27, enclosed
in Toulmin, July 28, file T-76, SWLR:Reg.; Madison to Smith, July 17, and to
Eustis, August 10, Eustis to Madison, August 19, PJM, 2: 419, 473-474, 497;
Eustis to Hampton, August 22, TP, 6: 102; Neutrality Act ofJune 5, 1794, US.
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Eustis granted Hampton the discretion and autonomy in
conducting operations that military commanders usually received
in the borderlands, explaining that:
to judge of [circumstances] as they may arise, and to
provide for them without the knowledge that is possessed
by the Officer commanding, present with, and knowing as
well the objects in view as the state of the different Corps
[military units] & Characters of the Officers, is equally
difficult & embarrassing. It remains, therefore, only to
refer to your discretion & Judgment for an execution of
the intentions & views of the Government so far as they
may depend on the Military Force. 7

7.

Statutes at Large, 1: 381-384. Andrew McMichael, "Reluctant Revolutionaries:
The West Florida Borderlands, 1785-1810" (PhD diss., Vanderbilt University,
2000), 208-212, provides the most thorough attention to the presence of
American deserters in West Florida. Carlos de Grand Pre to Sparks, August
24, and response, August 29, 1808, enclosed in Wilkinson, October 11, 1808,
file W-257, SWLR:Reg., presents an example of Sparks's belligerence prior to
the 1810 crisis, when the colonel defended an American incursion into West
Florida to seize deserters. Hampton issued a proclamation of amnesty to army
deserters in West Florida on March 2, hoping both that they would return to
the army and that this would reduce crime and disorder in the region; see file
H-73, and General Orders,June 8 (no file number), SWLR:Reg.
Leland L. Lengel, "Keeper of the Peace: Harry Toulmin in the West Florida
Controversy, 1805-1813" (MA thesis, Duke University, 1962), provides the most
thorough account of the judge's efforts to maintain order, while securing the
peaceful transfer of West Florida to the United States through means sanctioned
by international law. The judge's voluminous letters to Madison provide the most
detailed, and probably the most accurate, accounts of the crisis in the FortStoddertMobile region. Eustis cautioned Hampton that any reinforcements should be
delayed as long as possible because of the unhealthiness of Fort Stoddert, then
remarked that two companies from the Hiwassee River in upland East Tennesseewho were hundreds of miles away, and had not been seasoned in the lowland Gulf
climate-should be dispatched first, rather than those on the lower Mississippi
River. Indeed, the secretary suggested that troops from the region should replace
those in Tennessee if the latter were sent to Stoddert. He then observed that the
contingent deployed at Muscle Shoals removing whites squatting on Cherokee
lands might deter forays against Mobile, though they were at the opposite end of
what later became Alabama. Eustis reported to Madison that he had "intimated"
that Hampton could use those troops to reinforce Stoddert, again ignoring the
larger concentrations on the Mississippi River, who could be transported by water
along the coast if the Spanish agreed to permit their movement up the Mobile
River to Stoddert (There was no direct road between Stoddert and the Mississippi,
or between Stoddert and the Tennessee, though troops could march from the
Tennessee River to the Black Warrior River in north-central Alabama and descend
by boat to the Tombigbee River, ifthe water was high enough.). Not surprisingly,
it appears no reinforcements were dispatched.
Eustis to Hampton, August 22, TP, 6: 102.
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Holmes seconded the need for local knowledge and, perhaps
surprisingly, attributed that intelligence more to Sparks than to civil
-officials: Holmes was convinced "that you have it in your power to
give more correct information upon the subject than any other
gentleman friendly to the Government in your part of the Territory."
Even more remarkably, the governor made this assessment on the
basis of information from the State Department, which apparently
rated Sparks's information above Toulmin's, despite the judge's
voluminous letters to Holmes and the president. 8
The settler convention that met at St.John's Plains near Baton
Rouge on July 25 initially proclaimed its loyalty to the Spanish
crown, but neither reform nor stability appeared forthcoming, and
on September 23 armed Convention forces seized Baton Rouge,
killing two Spanish soldiers. The Convention then declared
independence and sought incorporation within the United States,
and local inhabitants quickly petitioned Holmes for a military
patrol, whose size and specific officers they suggested (and must
therefore have been familiar with). This may have been intended
to deter Spanish attack, but was just as probably made to prevent
banditry and slave flight, which seemed much more likely amid
the upheaval. Lacking instructions to send troops into Florida,
Holmes then asked Cushing, posted at Cantonment Washington
outside Natchez, to send troops to patrol the border, at least in
part to discourage slave unrest while so many white settlers were
congregated at Baton Rouge. 9
The danger that American citizens sympathetic to the
Convention, or merely in pursuit of loot, might move to join the
Convention forces or attack the Spanish fort at Mobile, possibly
precipitating war, seems to have caused little immediate concern
among U.S. officials. Indeed, Holmes instructed Cushing not "to
stop any white person who may be passing from either side." In midAugust, Eustis replied to Sparks's query with "general instructions"
to reinforce Fort Stoddert and "defeat the contemplated
expedition" against Mobile, but the War Department doubted
anything would actually happen. Eustis, whose term as secretary of
war was defined by vacillation and indecision on all fronts, gave no

8.
9.

Holmes to Sparks, September 9, TP, 6: 115.
Boston Columbian Sentinel, October 31, 1810, P. K Yonge Library of Florida
History, University of Florida; Holmes to Cushing, September 26 and 28, TP,
6: 120-22.
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further instructions, relying on the arrival of reinforcements and the
initiative of officers on the scene to discourage any turmoil. They
either failed to perceive his understanding of their responsibilities
or actively rejected it, for Cushing initially refused to act without
express orders from the War Department, an example of the often
contentious relationship between territorial governors and military
commanders that had developed during the preceding decade .10
The Madison administration was trying to deal with West Florida
covertly, to retain some degree of plausible deniability, but its longterm goals were clear to any informed observer. Add the confused,
often redundant chain of command and communications, and
the reaction of American officers was bound to be confused, the
bonds of subordination and accountability easily frayed. Given
the administration's well-known objectives, concern about British
intervention, and antipathy to Spain, U.S. policy was not as rigid
in opposition to filibustering as international peace, federal
neutrality law, or strict construction of the Constitution demanded.
Aggressive military officers, eager to win fame and glory advancing
national expansion, recognized the tenor of the times. That June,
for example, Lieutenant Colonel Zebulon Montgomery Pike wrote
to Eustis arguing that the United States should take advantage
of any request from the West Floridians lest they invite British
intervention instead. Word of the opportunity for military action
spread fast: by mid-August officers stationed as far away as Maine
felt "no doubt" that the United States would intervene, and that
war with Spain was therefore inevitable. Yet throughout most of
1810, commanders on the scene remained subordinate to civilian
authority-above all, the constitutional requirement for Congress
to declare war-in their public actions and communications. In
October, Cushing dispatched Colonel Leonard Covington from
Cantonment Washington (near Natchez) to Fort Adams, near the
northwestern border of West Florida, and reported that he could

10.

Ibid.; Eustis to Madison, August 19 and September 14, PJM, 2: 497 and 543.
The Spanish lieutenant was Louis (or Luis) Grand Pre; Carlos de Grand Pre
commanded the fort, though yet another officer, Carlos Dehault DeLassus,
held the formal rank of commandant. The records of the Convention are in
James A. Padgett, ed., "Official Records of the West Florida Revolution and
Republic," Louisiana Historical Quarterly 21 Quly 1938): 685-805, and Padgett,
"The West Florida Revolution of 1810, as Told in the Letters of John Rhea,
Fulwar Skipwith, Reuben Kemper, and Others," Louisiana Historical Quarterly
21 Qanuary 1938): 76-202.
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move 900 regulars into Florida with four days notice. Cushing
reassured the War Department that he would not enter Spanish
territory unless explicitly ordered to do so.11
After the West Florida Convention had established de facto
control over the parishes west of the Pearl River, the impulsive Sparks
became the most significant army officer on the border, his influence
growing as talk of attacking Mobile spread unabated among settlers
near Fort Stoddert. (The area between the Pearl and Mobile Rivers
was very thinly populated, nor were substantial Spanish posts present
in that region, so the Tombigbee settlements remained the focal
point for local antagonism toward Mobile.) Sparks had initially
condemned "the arts of cunning, and designing demagogues, ready
at all times to foment popular discontent, and fan the embers of
sedition ... to gain wealth and position through general anarchy." Yet
his views apparently changed during the ensuing months, realigning
to mesh with the expansionism he had displayed in the past, as he
talked face to face with filibuster leaders, who were usually territorial
militia commanders. The Convention granted commissions to some
of these commanders, contradicting their commissions from the
United States issued through the territory of Mississippi. Discussions
with filibuster leaders seem to have deluded Sparks, or he was willing
to lie to his superiors, for by mid-October the colonel was reporting
that the plotters had abandoned their plans. Ten days later he
received Reuben Kemper, who labeled Sparks "an old acquaintance,"
"warm" to the revolutionary cause, in his quarters at Fort Stoddert.
Indeed, Kemper claimed that unnamed U.S. military officers told
him he could recruit without interference if he just went a mile
south of the border-which was true, under the existing neutrality
laws-and he told federal district judge Toulmin, who consistently
opposed filibuster efforts, that Sparks supported his plans. 12
Stirring up unrest proved easier than controlling or repressing it.
The sluggish pace of communications aggravated uncertainty over the
Convention's intentions, which ultimately coalesced around union with
the United States. U.S. preparations to deal with the turmoil lagged
11.

Pike to Eustis,June 10, Letters Received by the Office of the Adjutant General,
M 566, Record Group 94, National Archives; Lt. Linai T. Helm to Col. Jacob
Kingsbury, August 20, Kingsbury Papers, Burton Historical Collection;
Cushing, October 3, file C-233, SWLR:Reg.
12. Sparks, July 12 and October 14, files S-168 and 229, SWLR:Reg.; Kemper to
John Rhea, October 28, 29, West Florida Papers, MS 25 and 26, Library of
Congress; Toulmin to Madison, November 22, PJM, 3: 23.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol92/iss1/5

12

Wilson: Conquerors, Peacekeepers, or Both? The U.S. Army and West Florida

Co

QUERORS, PEACEKEEPERS, OR

BoTH?

81

for the same reason. Somehow Madison's instructions for Holmes
were not mailed until August l; they did not arrive until September
29, and the governor was unable to mobilize his militia before the
administration received word of West Florida's independence in
mid-October. The Convention had already sought recognition and
protection from Holmes "as a loyal part of the United States"--just
before its forces attacked the Spanish garrison at Baton Rouge-but
Madison had no idea of this, nor could he place much faith in the
ability of the newly created Convention to guarantee U.S. control.
Above all, the president had no intention of risking the establishment
of an independent polity, a likely haven for bandits and perhaps a
pretext or base for British intervention, across the Mississippi River
from New Orleans. To permit this might prove worse than allowing
Spain to remain in control, which no longer seemed possible in the
face of settler unrest. Caught in a quintessential borderlands dilemma,
snared between local unrest and international uncertainty, Madison
resorted to the nation-state for his solution, invoking the American
claim to West Florida and asserting the extension of U.S. sovereignty
as far east as the Perdido River, twenty to thirty miles east of Mobile, on
his own authority on October 27. 13
Nevertheless, although the Convention had repeated its request
for union on October 10, the possibility of conflict remained because
the request stipulated that West Florida enter the United States with
concessions to local interests, particularly a pardon for American
deserters-the majority of the armed Convention force at Baton
Rouge-and validation of Spanish land sales (Madison soon used his
executive authority to grant the pardon; land claims took decades to
work through the legal process.). More dangerously, the Convention
admonished the secretary of state that it would have "to look to
some foreign Government for support, should it be refused to us"
(on Convention terms) by the United States. Concerned that these
conditions would not be met, Fulwar Skipwith, who the Convention
elected their governor on November 22, threatened to resist U.S.
annexation by force, and received some written authorization from
the Convention to prepare to do so, even after Claiborne arrived
at St. Francisville two weeks later with Madison's proclamations of
13. Journal of the West Florida Convention, September 22, Library of Congress;
Madison, proclamation, October 27, P]M., 2: 595-596. Madison 's path to the
proclamation can be followed in Stagg, "editorial
," note PJM, 2: 317-319,
and in Madison to Secretary of State Smith, July 17, Secretary of War William
Eustis, August 30, and Thomas Jefferson, October 19, P]M., 3: 419, 517, 585.
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annexation and pardon for army deserters. Anticipating trouble,
Claiborne ordered Covington to bring 250-300 troops and several
·cannon to Baton Rouge; he then asked for 700-800 troops, though
these proved unnecessary when the Convention holdouts, about 400
armed men, surrendered the town without a fight on December 10.
Eager to test himself regardless of who he fought, army lieutenant
George Birch growled that they "thought better of it ... to our great
disappointment. "14
The "Florida parishes" west of the Pearl River passed into
American hands and became part of the state of Louisiana in 1812,
but Madison's proclamation asserted U.S. sovereignty to the Perdido
River, nearly 150 miles to the east. The farther the United States
attempted to extend its control, the more the Republican doctrines
of strict constitutional construction and military preemption created
a paradoxical, even circular dilemma, threatening to undermine the
army's subordination and accountability to civilian control. With no
solution to Anglo-American tensions in sight, the danger of British
intervention appeared to demand further action to execute Madison's
proclamation. The Spanish junta in Cadiz was already allied with the
English, and Madison did not want American belligerence to spur
the British intervention he was claiming to preempt. Anticipating
that the ever-zealous Claiborne might overreach, the secretary of
state instructed the governor that Madison prohibited attacking any
Spanish troops or posts, "however small," remaining in the disputed
region. If adhered to, this order would calm two of the three potential
forces for war, for there was virtually no chance that the weak Spanish
contingents, largely isolated from outside support, would strike at
U.S. troops without provocation. The Spanish dispatched eighty
14. Request for annexation, John Rhea (president of the Convention) to Secretary
of State Robert Smith, October
States10, United
Congress, American State
Papers: Documents, Legis/,ative and Executive, of the Congress of the United States, C/,ass
I, Foreign Re/,ations (Washington, D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 1832-1861) (hereafter
ASPFR), 3: 395;Journal of the West Florida Convention, December 8, Library of
Congress; Claiborne to Smith and Covington, December 1-12, LBWCCC, 5: 35-55;
Birch, "Private Journal," December 10, Birch Family Papers, Historical Society
of Pennsylvania (which contains an account of the operation, which included
preparations for a bombardment of the Convention positions). Note that the
Convention request did not demand union as a separate state, nor that any
territory to which West Florida might be joined would immediately become a
state, as scholars often imply or suggest. Holmes accompanied Claiborne; the
governors' reports and correspondence can be followed in TP, 9: 889-915, and in
the LBWCCC; see also Cox, chapter 13. Covington immediately advocated that a
post office be established in Baton Rouge (file C.322, December 17, SWLR:Reg.).

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol92/iss1/5

14

Wilson: Conquerors, Peacekeepers, or Both? The U.S. Army and West Florida

CONQUERORS, PEACEKEEPERS, OR BOTH?

83

Map of West Florida. Map provided by the Center for Southeast Louisiana Studies,
Southeastern Louisiana University.

soldiers and twenty militiamen to disperse a filibuster camp at Saw
Mill Creek, on the east side of Mobile Bay, on December 10, but this
was their sole offensive action during the season-long campaign. The
remaining Spanish troops huddled together at Mobile, too weak to
dispute U.S. intervention outside their walls and hesitant to provoke
it by moving more aggressively against the motley bands of rebels,
filibusters, "militia," and marauders-constituted under shifting
guises, but virtually indistinguishable in practice-that effectively
controlled most of Florida west of the town. 15
With all these instruments at hand, U.S. officials continued
to employ their long-practiced "good cop, bad cop" routine of
intervening to restrain private adventurers, promising order and
stability but delivering at Spanish expense. On December 5, Claiborne
sent an agent to St. Francisville to distribute Madison's proclamations
to the Convention; the agentwas to gather intelligence on Convention
and Spanish forces, at Mobile and even Pensacola. When Claiborne
arrived at St. Francisville, he put an apparent halt to the formation
of an expedition against Mobile and Pensacola by 600 men under
Convention authority-an advance authorized by the Convention
the same day it requested union with the United States. Yet from
the Spanish perspective, the U.S. territorial militia continually being
organized and drilled in the environs of Fort Stoddert were really

15.

Smith to Claiborne, October 27, ASPFR., 3: 397; Cox, 483-484; Davis, 233.
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no different from Convention rebels. Nor were the Spanish wrong.
Commanders and former commanders of the militia like Joseph
Kennedy and James Caller had been organizers and supporters of
the "Mobile Society'' during the summer, loudly applauding the
Convention rebellion and calling for the seizure of Mobile. Kennedy
renounced his American citizenship to take a military commission
from West Florida. The militia included settlers of widely varying
stability; uncloaked by militia status some turned to banditry. To the
Spanish, claiming that they were militia rather than filibusters was no
more honest than the American claim to West Florida. 16
Senior U.S. officials, both civil and military, aggravated these
suspicions through their informal diplomacy. In October, James
Wilkinson wrote privately from Washington to James Innerarity,
a leading merchant sympathetic to the United States in Mobile,
suggesting that the town surrender rather than face a filibuster siege.
Wilkinson asked Innerarity to see if the Spanish commandant would
be willing to act on past hints from Governor Vicente Folch by calling
for U.S. assistance--effectively turning over control of the town and
province-against the threat to life and property, a threat posed by
Americans whom the United States was failing or refusing to control.
Edmund Gaines and his father-in-law Harry Toulmin both got in on
the negotiations during November, with Gaines acting as Sparks's
emissary. Toulmin, who the Spanish apparently permitted to enter
Mobile, repeated Wilkinson's suggestion to Innerarity, and sought to
intervene in a meeting between filibuster leaders Reuben Kemper and
Joseph Kennedy to forestall violence and disorder. Harkening back to
his experience as customs collector during a decade on the Mobile
frontier, Gaines proposed a less expansionist solution: that Sparks
employ a standing order from the War Department to request that
Folch abolish the duties on American goods at Mobile, which would
end the pretext for an attack on the port. This was hardly very realistic
given the belligerent chauvinism of the filibusters; when Sparks sent
two soldiers with Toulmin's pacific message to an American justice
of the peace, the filibuster-militia detained them, supposedly as
deserters. 17

16.

Claiborne to Audley L. Osborn, December 5, and Secretary of State Smith,
January 3, 1811, LBWCCC, 5: 45 and 69;Journal of the West Florida Convention,
October 10, Library of Congress.
17. Wilkinso n to James Innerarity, October 10, cited in Waciuma, 171 ; Cox, 471482; Toulmin to Madison, November 22 and 28, PJM, 3: 23 and 37. The soldiers
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GEN. EDMUND P. GAINES.
Major General Edmund Pendelton Gaines, 1777-1849. Oil on canvas by John
Wesley Jarvis. Image in Frank E. Stevens, The Black Hawk War ( 1903).

were quickly released, but the filibusters were not punished, presumably
because they claimed to be acting as militia commanders, dutifully checking
to prevent desertion. See James W. Silver, Edmund Pendleton Gaines: Frontier
General (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1949), for Gaines's
career; he served simultaneously as the military commander, civilian customs
collector, and postmaster at Fort Stoddert for most of the period between
1801 and 1810. He was also charged with surveying and clearing the post
road for the mail within U.S. territory, and he and another officer acted as
postal inspectors. TP, 5: 459-464 and 468-479; Harry DeLeon Southerland, Jr. ,
and Jerry Elijah Brown, The Federal Road through Georgia, the Creek Nation, and
Alabama, 1806-1836 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1989), 27.
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Throughout November Folch appeared to play ball with every
American official available, explaining to Holmes, Sparks, and
Toulmin that he had advised his superiors at Havana to surrender
the province. While awaiting word from them, Folch first offered
to abolish the duties on American goods, and at the beginning
of December told former U.S. Indian agent John McKee that he
would surrender at the end of the month, with or without orders,
if he had not been reinforced. Yet Folch was doing double duty,
practicing the diplomatic delaying tactics beloved by Spanish
officials since the 1790s while pressing the U.S. government to act
against the invaders in the interests of local stability, sparing Spain
the political, diplomatic, and financial costs of doing so. Folch
therefore agreed to permit Sparks to pursue and arrest filibusters
in territory still claimed by Spain, as Gaines had promised to do,
but Sparks had no real desire to halt the frontiersmen, to whom he
had become sympathetic, undercutting the apparent agreement by
refusing to act without explicit orders from the War Department. 18
Complex questions of authority, subordination, and
accountability quickly came into play amid this rapidly changing
welter of local, regional, and national diplomacy, conducted by
private individuals as well as civil and military officers. All the
American officials wanted Mobile, but none wanted to hazard
peace with Spain, or their careers-probably a greater concern
for most-by acting too precipitously. Their different positions
and emphases then led to further confusion and cross-purposes,
enabling the local advocates of expansion, commanders of the
Mississippi territorial militia who were eager to take Mobile
regardless of Spanish resistance, to seize the initiative and drive
events. Early in December, sharing Toulmin's national perspective
about constitutional war powers and hoping to forestall an attack
on Mobile, Choctaw agent Silas Dinsmoor advised the judge to
arrest filibuster leaders. Toulmin, the official most committed to
upholding national sovereignty, international law, and local order,

18.

PJM, 3: 38-39, notes 1-5; Folch to John McKee, December 2, TP, 6: 147, and

to Secretary of State Robert Smith, December 2, in the Hartford Courant
(with letter to McKee, Madison's message to Congress, and the congressional
resolution and act), June 26, 1811, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History,
University of Florida. Folch's true views, realistically pessimistic but loyal to
the Spanish crown, can be found in his "Reflections on Louisiana," in James
A. Robertson, ed., Louisiana Under the Ru/,e of Spain, France, and the United States,
1785-1807, 2 vols. (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark, 1911), 2: 325-347.
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had Joseph Kennedy, Reuben Kemper, and local magistrate John
Caller (who abetted the filibusters' organization) temporarily
detained (probably using military force) and questioned them at
Fort Stoddert between December 7 and 12.
Yet personal and expansionist sympathies continued to sway
Sparks, with whom Reuben Kemper "was in habits of constant,
daily, familiar and confidential intercourse." Indeed, Toulmin
contended that some of the army officers "had actually renounced
the U. States, & all had subscribed an oath of allegiance to the
Convention, [and] were adopted and authorized by Callier
[Caller], as officers to command the militia." The judge may have
been referring to militia officers; it seems highly unlikely that many
federal officers would break their oaths merely to join a filibuster,
when it was likely that the army itself would advance against Mobile.
Nor would they need to take the more radical step of swearing an
oath to another government, however American or pro-American
the Convention appeared. In any case, Kemper pressed Sparks
to send a message to Mobile offering some sort of cease-fire in
Kemper's name. When Toulmin explained that this would tacitly
recognize Kemper as a representative either of the United States or
a sovereign West Florida, Sparks's subordinates hesitated and the
colonel appeared to back away from the idea. Yet Sparks remained
as pugnacious as he was volatile. Reversing himself for a second
time in the space of a single day, the colonel dispatched Kemper's
proposal to Mobile, giving it even greater diplomatic weight by
placing it in the hands of a U.S. lieutenant. 19
Toulmin temporarily regained the upper hand by employing
the personal connections he had developed during six years in the
region to play the military commanders against each another. Acting
in concert with his father-in-law, Gaines intercepted the lieutenant
and prevented the delivery of Kemper's letter, while Toulmin softpedaled the incident to Madison by attributing Sparks's sympathy
for filibustering to inexperience. The judge was being conciliatory,
for Sparks had entered the U.S. Army nearly two decades before,
and had served in the southern borderlands for most of his career,
often in politically sensitive operations removing white citizen
squatters from Indian or public lands, operations that required just
the sort of judicious firmness Sparks should have displayed toward
19.

Toulmin to Madison, December 12, 1810 andjanuary 10, 1811,
and 110-111.
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the filibusters. Instead, while Claiborne lamented that he could
not "act against" the Spanish posts at Pass Christian and Pascagoula
without explicit presidential authorization, the impetuous colonel
assured Claiborne that he would find Sparks's cooperation "not
less zealous than it has been for thirty years past." 20
Though filibuster efforts had been repeatedly frustrated,
the colonel then tried to urge Mobile's surrender by playing
on Spanish fears, probably shared by many local inhabitants,
about depredations by militia-filibuster-marauders. This time
he deployed U.S. troops, precipitating renewed international
crisis. On December 21, Reuben Kemper left Fort Stoddert to
try to kidnap the Spanish commandant at Mobile (who lived in a
house in the town, rather than the fort), to compel him to order
the fort's surrender (According to Toulmin he left from Sparks's
house, where he had been staying, his legal status unclear, though
the judge again excused the colonel from culpability.). Toulmin
used his connection with Gaines to press Sparks to stop the foray;
influenced by six months of expansionist rhetoric and intrigue,
the colonel initially professed surprise at Kemper's action but
opined that Kemper was secretly backed by the U.S. government.
When finally persuaded he was wrong, Sparks appeared to change
his tune, breathlessly exclaiming to Claiborne that he had found
"undoubted proof that Kemper intended "to commit depredations on
the Inhabitants, and probably deluge it in blood, as a revenge" for his
defeat at Saw Mill Creek. 21
Yet Sparks had no intention of giving up the quest to cleanse
West Florida of Spanish occupation, repeating that he would
"rejoice to have an opportunity to convince my Country (whatever
my services may be) that thirty years of active service have not
extinguished my Zeal." Indeed, the pugnacious colonel felt "much
pleasure" advising Claiborne "that five complete companies of
Volunteers [none other than the filibuster-militia] await with
anxiety for the command to march" on Mobile; Sparks intended

20.

21.

Ibid.; Claiborne to Smith, December 17, and Sparks to Claiborne, December
16, 1810, LBWCCC, 5: 58 and 42. Emphasis in original, as throughout this essay.
Army biographical sources list Sparks entering the Legion of the United States
as a captain in 1792; he is not on the 1784 or 1789 registers of officers, but
probably served during the Revolution, or he would have been commissioned
a lieutenant or an ensign rather than a captain in the Legion.
Toulmin to Madison, January 10, 1811 , PJM 3: 112; Sparks to Claiborne,
December 21 , 1810, LBWCCC 5: 73.
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to supply them with arms from Fort Stoddert, while "the force
under my immediate command [meaning the regulars] awaits the
moment's warning." Justifying himself with Madison's October
proclamation of U.S. sovereignty to the Perdido, and the advice
of his subordinate officers, the colonel sent Gaines, three other
officers, and 50 regular soldiers "to take a station in the vicinity
of the Town to stop Col. Kemper." However, peacekeeping was
not Gaines's primary mission; Sparks simultaneously expressed his
confidence that Spanish officials would surrender to a representative
of the U.S. government to avoid bloodshed, presumably by the
very filibusters Gaines was supposed to stop. How could Spanish
officials possibly tell the difference between filibusters, militia, and
U .S. troops? The tension between accountability to constitution,
law, and civil authority and the operational discretion customarily
granted to military officers amid the uncertainties of borderlands
communications was about to be tested as never before, by a very
junior officer with little more than a decade in the army, who felt
little of that tension in his pursuit of American expansion. The
army's subordination to constitutional civil authority had not been
so sorely tried since James Wilkinson made his decision to halt and
turn against Aaron Burr on the banks of the Sabine River four years
before. 22
Stationed on the southern frontier since 1801, Edmund
Gaines's long experience pressing for the navigation of the Mobile
River had encouraged an expansionism tempered only by his
father-in-law: the captain had expressed hopes to win martial glory
against Mobile several years before the crisis. Arriving outside
Mobile on December 22, Gaines mustered the milling filibusters
into the Mississippi territorial militia, obligating the federal
government for their rations and pay, but hopefully bringing them
under federal military control, though disciplining them would
prove difficult. (However, the Constitution does not permit military
commanders to raise or muster troops on their own initiative-a
constraint Gaines would clash against throughout his career.)
Then, following a miniature council of war with his subordinates,

22.

Ibid., 5: 72-74. Sparks had not always been so eager to cooperate with federal
civil officials; in April 1797 he refused to provide an escort for the commissions
negotiating the second Tellico treaty with the Cherokee, and ordered a
subordinate to refuse to do so (Luke H. Banker, Fort Southwest Point, Kingston,
Tennessee [Kingston, Tenn.: Roane County Heritage Commission, 1984], 38-39).
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Gaines sent regular army captain John R. Luckett-one of the
officers implicated, though exonerated, in the Burr Conspiracy
in 1806-to demand the town's surrender under the authority
of Madison's proclamation, despite State Department orders to
Claiborne forbidding the use of force against Spanish positions.
Whether the governor ever forwarded Smith's instructions to any
military commander remains unclear, nor does it seem that the War
Department issued similar orders; Gaines and Sparks certainly did
not write or act as if they had, but the Constitution does not grant
the authority to initiate war to military officers. Gaines advised the
Spanish commandant, Captain Cayetano Perez, that Sparks had
ordered him "to take possession of the fort" and "demand[ed] an
immediate reply." Perez refused to hand over the fort, and Gaines
reported that he then "entered into a verbal agreement to suspend
my Operations against the Fort, until an Officer could be sent to
Pensacola" to see if Folch would order Perez to surrender Mobile.
Nevertheless, unwilling to forgo the opportunity for martial display
and intimidation, Gaines took position half a mile from the fort,
in plain view of its garrison. While tens of thousands fought in
massed battles against Napoleon for the fate of Spain, a mere
captain threatened war between Spain and the United States. 23
Miscommunication and misperception, perhaps intentional,
pervaded American discourse throughout the crisis. Indeed, this
willful confusion was almost a necessity for American officials if they
were to preserve a pretense of legitimacy. Thus Gaines's ultimatum

23.

Cox, 511-514; Toulmin to Madison,January 10, PJM3: 112; Smith to Claiborne,
October 27, 1810, cited in PJM 2: 596, note 4; Gaines to Perez, and response,
December 22, 1810, and to Cushing, January 2, in Cushing, January 15, file
C-335, SWLR:Reg. (this folder will hereafter be cited only as "Cushing, file
C-335"). See Gaines to Secretary of War Henry Dearborn, January 19 and April
17, 1807, TP 5: 495 and 546-54 7, for earlier exam pl es of his expansionism. All
documents from this point forward are from 1811, unless otherwise indicated.
Gaines mustered the militia under the auspices of Mississippi governor
Holmes' authorization to Sparks (Davis, 234). The War Department sent
orders to Cushing that implied he should not attack Spanish posts, but did
not forbid threats or intimidation against them (December 21 , 1810, TP 6:
163). Luckett's full name was John Roger Nelson Luckett, hence some sources
refer to him as Nelson , or John N. , Luckett. See Luckett deposition re Burr,
enclosed in Wilkinson, January 15, 1807, file W-234, SWLR:Reg.; Surgeon 's
Mate Richard Davidson, file D-1807, SWLR: Unregistered Series; Wilkinson,
January 8, 1807, SWLR: Unregistered Series. Ironically, Gaines was the officer
who detained Aaron Burr, while Luckett conveyed Burr associate John Adair
as a prisoner to Washington early in 1807; see Silver, 14-15.
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to Perez asserted the "conciliatory course" of the U.S. government
while explaining the "weighty considerations of duty and Attachment
- by which the officers of the American Army are prompted to support
ameasure adopted by their beloved President," as if the Spaniard had
no duty or attachment of his own. Despite Perez's written refusal,
Gaines encouraged Sparks by claiming that the Spanish commandant
"verbally expresses great willingness" to surrender the fort. More
dangerously, the pugnacious captain seems to have believed that
Madison had authorized an assault on Spanish positions, without
questioning the absence of written orders from the War Department,
which were so dear to most of his fellow commanders. Though
Perez warned that he would fire if more than five or six Americans
approached the fort together, Gaines now claimed the militiafilibusters were unnecessary to implement American plans: "I trust
[the Spanish] will not be so silly as to put themselves to the hazard,
or us to the trouble of scaling the Walls of the Fort, as the conflict will
endanger the Town .... the Regulars [by themselves] are capable of
doing the Work." (He did ask Sparks for two field guns, presumably
for intimidation; at some point the colonel reinforced Gaines with
a company of mounted militia.) Meanwhile another officer, part of
the detachment that had occupied the region around Baton Rouge,
lamented being recalled to Fort Adams on the Mississippi: "why we
return I am unable to conjecture-our force is certainly sufficient to
bear down all opposition-our leaders are perhaps waiting to hear
from Congress"-as they were supposed to under the Constitution. 24
Inararemomentofcaution-perhapsfromfearhissubordinate
would get all the glory-Sparks responded that Gaines should "act
on the defensive, until I arrive with reinforcements." (Preempted
by Thomas Cushing's arrival at Mobile on January 3, Sparks does
not appear to have gone there during the crisis.) Gaines did try
to reassure the civilian inhabitants of Mobile, sending Captain

24.

Gaines to Perez, and response, December 22, and Gaines to Sparks, December
23, 1810, in Cushing, file C-335; Cushing to Claiborne, January 8, enclosed
in Cushing, January 8, file C-336, SWLR:Reg.; Baltimore Federal Republican
and Commercial Gazette, January 29, and Wilmington American Watchman,
February 27 (enclosing a December 28, 1810 "letter from an officer of the
army"), Readex America's Historical ewspapers online database (http: / / 0infoweb.newsbank.com. usmalibrary.usma.edu/ iw-search / we/ HistArchive?p_
product=EANX&p_action=timeframes&p_theme=ahnp&p_nbid=L63S4FPI
MTM3Mjl20DcONC4zNTUxMzE6MToxMjoxMzQuMjQwLjYuMzA&p_clear_
search=yes&d_refprod=EANX&, (accessed 25 June 2013).
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Luckett back to Perez on New Year's Day with assurances "that no
operations ... will be commenced against the Fort" without "timely
notice" to enable civilians to depart: "considerations of humanity,
and the honor of the United States Troops, dictate this course."
Hoping that Perez would accept U.S. claims as more legitimate
than rebel or filibuster ones, Luckett tried to distinguish between
U.S. soldiers and filibusters by emphasizing that the West Florida
Convention had been superseded by the United States through
Madison's proclamation. Presumably the filibusters still roaming
around Mobile had entered U.S. service-or the United States
lacked the will or ability to enforce national law and civil order in
the face of armed citizens, which is probably how Perez understood
the situation. Either way, the Spaniard remained unintimidated,
a more dutiful officer of his sovereign than the Americans were of
theirs. 25
Sparks and Gaines appeared well in tune with their civilian
superiors in Washington, but the spirit and politics of the moment
continued to collide with the letter of the law. In January 1811
Congress secretly granted Madison the authority to "preoccupy"
West Florida as far as the Perdido River (just west of Pensacola)
in order to forestall foreign (presumably British) intervention
there, and the State Department launched special agents George
Mathews and John McKee toward the Florida frontier in pursuit
of pretexts.
The congressional resolution added legislative
sanction to Madison's proclamation of sovereignty, reducing
the likelihood of conflict over the separation of powers in case
the American advance led to war, but no explicit decision had
been made authorizing an assault on Spanish positions, perhaps
because Madison and the secretary of war-neither noted for their
administrative efficiency-assumed none was necessary. After all,
why would military officers think themselves authorized to commit
acts of war, as international custom certainly viewed such an assault,
without a declaration of war, or at least specific instructions from
the national executive? If intimidation failed, would the United
States go to war to extend its sovereignty over Mobile? Would
miscalculated efforts at intimidation by a 34-year old captain lead

25.

Sparks to Gaines, December 24, 1810, Gaines memo for Luckett, January 1,
and Gaines to Cushing.January 2, in Cushing, file C-335; Cushing to Claiborne,
January 8, enclosed in Cushing, January 8, file C-336, SWLR:Reg.
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to war without the constitutionally reqms1te declaration by the
people's elected representatives in Congress, and perhaps to the
British intervention Madison hoped to preempt? 26
The colonel and captain faced little immediate oversight
nor restraint except from Judge Toulmin, the only senior civilian
official on the scene. Neither Holmes or Claiborne were at Mobile
or Fort Stoddert during the crisis, and Holmes left little record
of attention to the illegal expeditions afoot in his territory that
December. James Wilkinson had been in Washington since mid1810, and Hampton had not exerted effective command over
Cushing, Sparks, and Gaines, during the Convention rebellion or
the occupation of western Florida. Indeed, Wilkinson's absence
gave Claiborne a long-sought opportunity to try to centralize
the direction of civil and military affairs in pursuit of expansion;
Claiborne, rather than Hampton, led the army force that occupied
the "Florida parishes" along the Mississippi in December. The
pugnacious governor simultaneously sought intelligence on
Spanish strength at Mobile and Pensacola, despite receiving explicit
orders from the State Department that forbade using force against
Spanish posts. Yet Claiborne's thirst for expansion was frustrated
by Toulmin's unrelenting pressure on the military commanders,
which created enough uncertainty about civilian support to induce
a modicum of caution and accountability to orders (however
vague or implicit). This restraint, and subordination to national
civilian authority, was then bolstered further by the resistance of
Brigadier General Wade Hampton, Wilkinson's replacement as
theater commander, to direct command by Claiborne over his
subordinates. Historian Theodore Crackel points out that one
reason President Jefferson commissioned Hampton brigadier in
1808 was to loosen Wilkinson's hold over the allegiances of the
officer corps; Hampton's appointment does not seem to have

26.

Madison's request for the authority to preoccupy West Florida (dated January
3, 1811) is in James D. Richardson, comp., Compilation of the Messages and
Papers of the Presidents (New York: Bureau of National Literature, 1897) , 2: 473;
the congressional resolution is in the U.S. Statutes at Large 3: 471-472. See
also William S. Belko, "The Origins of the Monroe Doctrine Revisited: The
Madison Administration, the West Florida Revolt, and the No Transfer Policy,"
Florida Historical Quarterly 90 (Fall 2011): 157-92, and more generally John A.
Logan, No Transfer, An American Security Principle (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1961).
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done much toward that end, but did foster far more international
restraint. Whether this outcome was expected or intended, or
whether Madison was as worried about restraining Wilkinson as
Jefferson had been, remains unclear. 27
Hampton's behavior in command demonstrates that Wilkinson
was not the only senior military officer whose personality shaped
policy and outcomes in the borderlands. Hampton focused
on the defense of New Orleans when first he took command;
he had often been ill; and he was probably distracted by his
extensive investments in Louisiana plantations. After the new
year, the slave rebellion in the German Coast region of Louisiana,
along the Mississippi across from the "Florida parishes," a revolt
that Hampton believed the army's dispersion had encouraged,
combined with the general's anger with Claiborne over the
governor's claim to order military deployments, spurred Hampton
to self-assertion. Some scholars have suggested that that German
Coast rebellion put the offensive against Mobile "on hold," an
argument that suits modern interpretive perspectives very nicely,
but Hampton's language demonstrates that his primary motive for
restraining his subordinates was mounting anger at Claiborne's
attempts to command them. The German Coast rebellion was
quickly repressed early in January, and there is no evidence that
troops were redeployed from Florida to Louisiana in response. It
is doubtful that the general was opposed to expansion per se, but
the effect of his irritation was military reluctance to press forward
along the aggressive lines laid out by the other government officials

27.

Claiborne to Secretary of State Smith, January 6, Folch, January 7, and
Jefferson, January 20, LBWCCC 5: 89-90, 93, 113; Smith to Claiborne, October
27, 1810, cited in PJM2: 596, note 4; Theodore]. Crackel, Mr.Jefferson's Army:
Political and Social Reform of the M ilitary Establishment, 1801-1809 (New York:
New York University Press, 1987), 174-175. There are only two letters from
Holmes in the published Mississippi Territorial Papers between December 3,
1810, and January 8, 1811 , one of them to Toulmin on December 26 lamenting
that filibusters were still operating. While the full Territorial Papers in the
State Department contain more correspondence, it is remarkable that there
was so little worth publishing about Holmes' attitude toward the filibusters,
particularly after he had acted as the government's point man in the region
during the summer and autumn of 1810. Perhaps Holmes saw Madison's
selection of Claiborne to direct the occupation of West Florida as placing him
in a subordinate position, or relieving him of responsibility for events in West
Florida, but the focus of filibustering had shifted to the Fort Stoddert area, in
Mississippi Territory, Holmes' responsibility.
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in the region, bringing the extension of U.S. sovereignty in West
Florida to a halt until Wilkinson resumed command in 1813. 28
Hampton began his reassertion of institutional control in
December by dispatching Colonel Cushing, his senior subordinate
and a former adjutant and inspector general, who had initially led
the troops that faced Spain on the Sabine in 1806, to Mobile to take
command from Sparks and Gaines. Federal civil officials, perhaps
with more national perspectives or allegiances than the regionally
oriented Claiborne, also continued trying to restrain the filibustermilitia. Growing ever more desperate, Judge Toulmin, who had
gone to Mobile in part because he held the contract for purchasing
supplies for the U.S. troops, sailed for 28 hours onto Mobile Bay
to find Cushing and persuade him to disband the ill-disciplined
militia, for whom few provisions were available. Whether because
of Toulmin's advice, the lack of supplies, or Gaines's confidence
in the regulars, on December 28 Cushing instructed Sparks, who
appears to have remained at Fort Stoddert during the crisis, that
no militia would be required around Mobile. Yet according to
Toulmin, Sparks initially responded by avowing the need for the
militia, sending one ofits officers, whom Toulmin labeled "a partisan
... of the Kemper expedition," to Cushing with the instructions
to call out militia to stop filibuster depredations around Mobile
that he had received from Claiborne. In any case, Gaines's January
1 memo for Luckett, on the scene at Mobile itself, indicated that
Cushing had decided to keep the militia in the field. The colonel
may have changed his mind, expecting resupply or hoping to
keep potential filibusters and bandits under military discipline, or
Gaines's memo may have expressed the captain's understanding
of Cushing's views before December 28; the documentary record
does not make it clear, given uncertainty over when the letters were
actually received. 29
Logistics ultimately proved decisive, as hunger displaced greed
and ideological zeal: on January 2 Sparks advised Cushing that he

28.

29.

Ronald E. Bridwell, "The South's Wealthiest Planter: Wade Hampton I of
South Carolina" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of South Carolina, 1980): 579583; Kastor, "'Motives of Peculiar Urgency,"' 840. Note that Hampton wanted
to resign if "the state of public affairs permits" (April 7, 1810, file H-106,
SWLR:Reg.).
Toulmin to Madison, January 10, PJM 3: 113; Cushing to Sparks, December 28,
1810, Gaines memo for Luckett, January 1, in Cushing, file C-335.
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had only three days' provisions and had sent home a company of
militia riflemen. (It is not clear whether this was from Fort Stoddert
or Mobile, but they were so close that it makes little difference.)
Tensions remained high: Cushing observed that "a General
expectation of immediate hostilities pervaded all ranks" upon his
arrival with gunboats and approximately 300 regulars on January
3; the people of Mobile had fled to the fort or the countryside,
fearing the town would be destroyed by an exchange of artillery
fire. (Cushing did contribute to these fears: Captain Perez refused
his request to sail upriver, pending permission from Folch, but
Cushing did so anyway.) Still lacking written authorization to initiate
hostilities, Cushing, a former adjutant general well acquainted with
the demands and constraints of legal accountability and political
reality, decided to call a halt to aggressive proceedings. Trying
to refashion a semblance of accountability, Cushing reported to
the War Department that he had initially believed that Sparks was
acting on Hampton's orders. Finding this was not the case, on
January 4 he advised Sparks that there was no good motive "for
calling out the militia, or authority for sending Captain Gaines"
to Mobile, asserting that his subordinates' actions "could not have
been contemplated by Claiborne." The colonel then instructed
Sparks to send home the four to six companies of militia at Fort
Stoddert. 30
The colonel was giving Claiborne more credit than he deserved.
Just a week before, the governor had hinted that Cushing should
"invite" the Spanish to "evacuate" Mobile "if ... you should have
good reason to believe, that a disposition exists" to do so "peaceably."
On the other hand, Claiborne warned Cushing not to enter any
"formal negotiation, nor sign any instrument ... which should look
like Articles of ... Capitulation" by the Spanish, for these might
suggest a state of war. Claiborne's objective was to avoid political
embarrassment, and hopefully real war, by preserving the fiction
of peace while intimidating Spanish officials into surrender. The
following day the governor cautioned Sparks that if the Spanish
refused "the demand you designed to make"-a demand that

30.

Sparks to Cushing, January 2, and response, January 4, in Cushing, file C-335;
Cushing to Claiborne, January 8, enclosed in Cushing, January 8, file C-336,
SWLR:Reg. Cushing had originally been dispatched to Fort Stodden; he
reported that it took him 49 ( !) days by ship from Natchez to Mobile due to
adverse winds and weather, probably ·most of it waiting in New Orleans.
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Sparks had not actually stated to Claiborne, showing how clearly
they understood each other-"it will then [and not before] be
proper" to advise them that he had no authority to attack the fort.
In other words, the governor hoped the appearance of U.S. regular
troops would intimidate the Spanish into surrendering, but he was
foolishly arrogant to imagine that the Spanish, heirs to centuries of
intricate bureaucracy and nuanced diplomacy, would do so without
inquiring into their authority. 3 1
Cushing could hardly pin the blame for this belligerence on
the senior federal civil official south of Tennessee and west of
Georgia. Instead, trying to preserve some shred of deniability,
the colonel reasserted military accountability to national policy,
advising Sparks that his actions were "much to be regretted" and
reassuring the War Department that he considered the ultimatum
to Perez an "ill-timed ... embarrassment." On January 8 the colonel
remarked to Claiborne that he "assumed" the governor had orders
from Washington, and was therefore willing to follow Claiborne's
directions, but had heard nothing from Hampton or the War
Department. Indeed, the colonel reported to the War Department
the same day that he did not know where Hampton was. (On
December 21 the War Department sent Cushing authorization to
occupy any posts the Spanish "voluntarily offered or abandoned,"
but these instructions would not arrive for weeks. Nor, unlike
Claiborne's instructions, did they forbid the sort of threats and
intimidation Sparks had ordered and Gaines had practiced.)
Cushing had not heard from Perez since his arrival nearly a week
before, but the colonel's lack of instructions led him to take the
initiative in calming tensions. On January 9 he advised the Spaniard
that he would not use force without further orders; two days later
he promised Perez that he would act "by every means in my power
to maintain and promote" peace. The events that followed were no
more paradoxical, and much happier for all involved in the crisis,
than Sparks's wavering between law enforcement and aggression.
Recognizing fellow military gentlemen, the two commanders took
to calling on one another, developing "a friendly intercourse";
Perez allowed Cushing to rent a house in Mobile while his soldiers
waited in tents outside the town; Judge Toulmin thought this gave

31.

Claiborne to Cushing, December 27, and to Sparks, December 28, 1810, in
Cushing, file C-335.
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"much confidence to the inhabitants." Indeed, the judge reported
that Cushing had brought his "family" to live in the house, though
this probably meant the colonel's military aides. By mid:January
Cushing had discharged the militia; Perez then allowed Toulmin
to land supplies, and Reuben Kemper gave up and went to Baton
Rouge. 32
Unfortunately for Cushing, Claiborne's assertions of military
authority, however innocently intended, angered Hampton, and
cooperation between federal civil and military officials outside
Mobile came to a virtual standstill, reinforcing obstacles to
American military adventurism. Shortly after Christmas, more
concerned about the growing dispersion of his troops around the
Gulf than with establishing civil order in West Florida, the general
countermanded Covington's move, made at Claiborne's request,
to send two companies to patrol the shores of Lake Pontchartrain.
For Hampton, institutional authority and professional privilege
were priorities: "so far as the military pride of the officer, and the
reliance upon his professional rights can be considered as of any
utility to the army," Claiborne's command over its officers "cannot
have been exercised without the infliction of a deep injury to the
institution." Never one to remain tactfully silent, Hampton pinned
his sword to the wall, demanding from the secretary of war "when in
the name of Heaven are we to have done with the civil authority, &
when shall our officers be taught to [recognize the] only legitimate
course of official communication [the military chain of command]
without which every attempt at military subordination is a mere
farce!" The imperious general had somehow forgotten that Eustis
was the immediate agent of civilian control over the army under
the Constitution, but the Madison administration was far too weak
politically to make an issue over the imperious general's slip of the

32.

Cushing to Sparks, and to Perez, January 4 and 9, 1811, in Cushing, file C-335;
Cushing to Claiborne, January 8, enclosed in Cushing, January 8, file C-336,
SWLR:Reg.; Eustis to Cushing, December 21, 1810, TP, 6: 163; Toulmin to
Madison, January 23, PJM, 3: 130; New York Spectator, January 23, Readex
America '.s Historical Newspapers online database (http: / / 0-infoweb.newsbank.
com.usmalibrary.usma.edu/ iw-search/ we/ HistArchive?p_product=EANX&p_
action=timeframes&p_theme=ahnp&p_nbid=L63S4FPIMTM3Mjl20DcON
C4zNTUxMzE6MToxMjoxMzQuMjQwLjYuMzA&p_clear_search=yes&d_
refprod=EANX&, (accessed 25 June 2013) . Cushing and Gaines resided in
Mobile while their troops were deployed outside the town, a fine example of
genteel reciprocity among U.S. and Spanish national officers.
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pen. It would take a real war before the nation could escape such
self-centered generals as Wilkinson and Hampton. Both men lost
their field commands after refusing to cooperate with each other
in the offensive against Montreal in the fall of 1813; Hampton
resigned the following April and Wilkinson was discharged in
1815. 33
By the beginning of 1811, Claiborne had concluded that the
Spanish would not surrender or withdraw from Mobile. Although
officers at distant posts, including at least one Federalist, continued
to express satisfaction at U.S. expansion into West Florida, matters
around Mobile again settled into a standoff. On January 24,
Claiborne tried to conciliate Hampton by insinuating that the
troops had only been sent to Mobile at Sparks's initiative, to
prevent depredations by the filibusters, "a subject of some moment
which I omitted to introduce to your attention." The governor
suggested that a Spanish attempt to reinforce Mobile would
constitute an incursion into U.S. territory, justifying an assault on
the fort. The general agreed to uphold U.S. sovereignty under
the president's proclamation, instructing Cushing to prevent the
arrival of Spanish troops "by force," but did not take Claiborne's
hint or attempt to stop food from reaching the fort. A nationalist
like any other government officer, Hampton does not appear to
have been opposed to extending American sovereignty eastward,
but he wanted to direct the soldiers under his command himself.
Early in February he relented to the point of envisioning aid to the
civil power for "maintaining order, and suppressing any opposition
to the laws," but made sure to lecture Claiborne that "it can never
be supposed that the President ... would attempt to exercise" his
military authority "by the substitution of an authority destitute
of Military rank" like the governor. Hampton's limited patience
quickly wore thin. On February 3, Cushing erred by telling the
general that removing the troops from Mobile would "have a
very unhappy effect on the minds of the inhabitants ... & will
subject all those who are desirous of becoming American Citizens,
to the most tyranic [sic] & insulting treatment from the Spanish
Commandant." Now believing his chief subordinates in league

33.

Claiborne, January 3, file C-330, Covington, December 25, 1810, file C-323,
Hampton, January 3 and 19, files H-278 and 294, SWLR:Reg.; Claiborne to
Secretary of State Smith, December 23 and 28, 1810 and January 3, 1811 ,
LBWCCC, 5: 59, 66, 70-71.
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with the governor, Hampton blew up and initiated court-martials
against Cushing and Sparks for their "unauthorized measures"
outside Mobile, while tasking Covington with "the suppression of
all unauthorized military enterprises by the Inhabitants" of West
Florida. The self-righteous general felt none of Cushing's need
to cover for his superiors, chiding the secretary of war that his
"unfortunate" habit of writing directly to subordinate officers had
deluded Hampton into believing Sparks's actions were legitimate. 34
The chance, however remote, of Spanish capitulation also
ended in February, when Folch was resupplied with specie, assured
of assistance by his superiors in Havana, and ordered to defend his
province "until the last extremity." In March Hampton attempted
to resume negotiations with Folch, but he refused to give up any
operational control over his subordinates. In April, reacting
to War Department orders to cooperate with Madison's special
agents, George Mathews and John McKee, the general directed
Covington that "any requisition ... requiring a movement of any
portion of the troops under your command is to be forwarded to
me for my instructions." Following Hampton's lead, Covington
refused to give Madison's agents troops to occupy the eastern
shore of Mobile Bay: they lacked specific written authorization,
and he saw no imminent foreign threat. The colonel did send two
companies to Pass Christian at Hampton's direction, but refused to
aid customs enforcement at Fort Stoddert early the following year.
During the month of March, Convention loyalists raised that flag
at St. Francisville by the Mississippi River, but Hampton threatened
force to have it taken down, and U.S. sovereignty was reaffirmed.
For the rest of the year army operations in West Florida focused on
34.

Claiborne to Secretary of State Smith, January 3, LBWCCC, 5: 71 ; Col. Jacob
Kingsbury to Surgeon Francis LeBarron, February 28, Kingsbury Papers,
Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library; Claiborne to Hampton,
January 24, LBWCCC, 5: 115-116; Hampton to Cushing, January 24, and to
Claiborne, February 9, Cushing to Hampton, February 3, all enclosed in
Cushing to Hampton, February 27, file C-362, SWLR:Reg. ; Hampton, February
21 (enclosing Hampton to Covington, February 20) , file H-306, SWLR:Reg.;
Hampton to Covington, April 9 and May 9, Mathews and McKee to Covington,
May 9, and response, May 10, all enclosed in Covington, May 22, file C-414,
SWLR:Reg. Claiborne to Hampton, February 14, LBWCCC, 5: 153-154, asserted
the need to advance American authority to the Perdido River, per Madison's
proclamation, and to establish a post from which to ward off Spanish moves
and launch an offensive against Mobile when authorized. Claiborne also
asserted his military authority as governor per various acts of Congress, but
indicated that he would not seek to exercise it.
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restraining the brigandage of filibusters-turned-marauders. The
general did send Gaines back from Stoddert to Mobile in March,
when Claiborne requested assistance against banditry, but the
marauders turned out to be on the Pascagoula, where as many as
300 U.S. troops were sent in pursuit of a band led by Sterling Dupre.
Filibustering against Spain remained acceptable among American
frontiersmen, and a grand jury sitting in Toulmin's court refused
to indict Reuben Kemper for violations of federal neutrality law. 35
Tensions between the United States and Spain continued; in
May Folch declared that U.S. ships would not be permitted to pass
Mobile without permission from his superior, the governor general
of Cuba. Two months later, U.S. gunboats maneuvered up a side
channel in the Mobile River to threaten the Spanish fort, compelling
the Spanish to allow an American ammunition vessel to pass. That
autumn the army began building roads from Fort Stoddert to
Baton Rouge, the Tennessee River, and Fort Hawkins (essentially
modem Macon), in Georgia, consolidating the American hold
over West Florida outside Mobile and preparing for future power
projection against Indians and Spain. Probably tired of surveying
roads (he had done an early survey for the Natchez Trace), Gaines
took furlough in August; the sympathetic Claiborne offered him a
commission as judge for the new parish of Bay St. Louis. Despite
his exertions to maintain peace and constitutional authority,
Cushing was found guilty of "taking an improper and unauthorised
[sic] attitude with his command contiguous to the town of Mobile,"

35.

Secretary of State Smith to Folch, January 28, TP, 9: 922; Folch to John
McKee, February 27, enclosed in Cushing, February 27, file C-396, SWLR:Reg.;
Bridwell, "The South's Wealthiest Planter," 583 and 608; Rembert W. Patrick,
Florida Fiasco: Rampant R ebels on the Georgi,a-Florida Border, 1810-1815 (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 1954) , 36; Cox, 580-581; Hampton to Covington,
May 9, enclosed in Covington, May 22, file C-414; Claiborne to Secretary of
State James Monroe, March 22, LBWCCC, 5: 187; Major John Darrington to Lt.
George Birch, February 22, in Birch, "Private Journal," Birch Family Papers,
Historical Society of Pennsylvania; Toulmin to Madison, March 14, PJM, 3: 221;
Davis, 270. See Claiborne to Secretary of State Smith, December 23 and 28,
1810, and January 3, 1811, LBWCCC, 5: 59, 66, and 70, for the governor's belief
that U.S. troops were necessary to maintain civil order around the Bay St. Louis.
See Toulmin to Madison, March 6, PJM, 3: 201, and Washington National
Intelligencer, "Our Southern Frontier," May 7, Ga/,e Nineteenth Century American
Newspapers online database (http:/ / 0-infotrac.galegroup.com.usmalibrary.
usma.edu / i tw I infomark / 0 I 1I 1I purl=rc6_NCNP?sw_aep=westl0360,
(accessed 25 June 2013), for rumors of unrest and resistance to U.S. authority
among West Floridians, especially along the Pascagoula.
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but acquitted of giving "alarm and apprehension to the officers
of a foreign power in amity with the United States." (The judge
advocate, essentially the prosecutor, was Captain Winfield Scott.)
Faced with such vague charges, the colonels escaped serious
sanction; Sparks followed Cushing to the colonelcy of the Second
Infantry, while Cushing went on to match Hampton's rank as an
adjutant general during the War of 1812. Both were discharged
in 1815, after twenty-four years' service. In April 1812, Congress
added the territory between the Pearl and Perdido Rivers to the
Mississippi Territory, and Holmes organized the area as a county
that summer, but the United States did not attempt to govern within
Mobile or its immediate environs until James Wilkinson compelled
its surrender early the following year, after war with Britain had
begun. The army's discretion, autonomy, and accountability had
been sorely tried during the Mobile crisis. Aside from Cushing's
caution, confused communications, personal and institutional
jealousy, and Spanish obstinacy proved the most important factors
that sustained the army's accountability to constitutional authority,
preventing an illegal assault on Mobile. 36
The Mobile crisis, and the U.S. military occupation of West
Florida more generally, present several instructive conclusions.
First, diplomacy was conducted as much by federal military officers
36.

New York Public Advertiser, May 22, Readex Americas Historical Newspapers online
database; Washington National Intelligencer, July 30, "Floridian
Affairs,"
and
November 11 , "From Mobile," Ga/,e Nineteenth Century American Newspapers
online database (http: / / 0-infotrac.galegroup.com.usmalibrary.usma.edu/
itw/ infomark/ 0/ l / l / purl=rc6_NCNP?sw_aep=westl0360,
(accessed
25
June 2013); Claiborne to Secretary of State James Monroe, August 14, and
to Gaines, August 15, LBWCCC, 5: 334-335; John D.W. Guice and Thomas
D. Clark, Frontiers in Conflict: The Old Southwest, 1795-1830 (Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1989), 86. See Cushing, March 6 and 27, files
C-380 and 395, SWLR:Reg., with enclosures, for the dispute between Hampton
and Cushing, which intensified as Cushing refused to report for arrest and
trial at Cantonment Washington, in Mississippi Territory several hundred
miles from Mobile, due to a "tumor" (apparently either hemorrhoids or a
groin infection) that made it difficult for him to ride. Hampton took this as
insubordination and threw the book at him, perhaps as a substitute for his
inability to do so against Claiborne or Eustis. The court sentenced Cushing to a
public reprimand in general orders. Hampton disagreed with the findings but
confirmed the sentence. See the charges and extracts from the court-martial
against Cushing, and a related general order, published in the New Orleans
Gazette and Daily Advertiser, May 14, 1812, attached to Hampton to Eustis, May
9, 1811 , file H-346, SWLR:Reg. This file encloses an "extract from general
orders," April 27, 1811 stating that it enclosed the court-martial proceedings
for Sparks, but they are not on the microfilm reel.
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as by civilian officials or non-state actors. This was national, federal,
and military diplomacy, as well as "local diplomacy" by settlers and
their political representatives and allies. Much as in the Sabine
crisis in 1806, the civilian federal territorial governors, Claiborne
and Holmes, took a back seat to military officers who commanded
forces at the scene of the crisis, including young Gaines and the
middle-ranking colonels Cushing and Sparks, as well as Hampton.
In other words, scholars create a false dichotomy when they contrast
a "local diplomacy" of civilian officials, oriented toward local and
regional interests (though the leading civilian officials were in fact
federal appointees, like the governors and Judge Toulmin) with a
national diplomacy conducted from Washington. The reality was a
multifaceted, overlapping spectrum of local, regional and national
perspectives, in which federal military commanders served as a
crucial link, because they commanded physical power on the spot
that the governors, dependent on the poorly disciplined militia,
lacked. Though many of the military officers felt strong local and
regional attachments, their institutional interests, in autonomy from
direct civilian command by governors or in covering themselves
against charges of irresponsibility, ultimately led to restraint.
Under these circumstances, when Spanish officials could see
little difference between territorial militia, armed volunteers,
filibusters, and brigands, control over the use of force emerged
as a critical dimension of U.S. foreign relations and diplomacy.
Control over military force meant that the international crisis
was also a crisis of domestic law and order and a crisis of civilmilitary relations. International, domestic social and political, and
military institutional order and stability were inextricably linked.
(A current analogy might be to the Afghan-Pakistan borderlands
or the war in Iraq, where the identity and authority of armed
groups have often been unclear, bedeviling U.S. diplomacy and
security efforts.) The federal military commanders, particularly
Cushing and Hampton, were able first to successfully assert their
autonomy from civilian control (by Governor Claiborne), then to
escape any sanction, probably because the Madison administration
realized that Claiborne, rather than the army's senior leaders, had
threatened international peace and administration objectives.
Control over the use of force proved decisive to the outcome
of the West Florida revolution and the American threats against
Mobile. The officers of the national standing army juggled the
Madison administration's encouragement for the revolution
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with desires for local, regional, and international stability,
their expansionist sympathies with their oaths to uphold the
Constitution and national sovereignty over international relations,
cooperation with belligerent territorial civil officials with their
desire for institutional autonomy. They had no standing orders,
no "rules of engagement," and no officially designated civilian
political advisers on the scene to guide them. Practically, the army's
presence meant that West Florida did not become a separate polity
outside the United States, where it might have drawn American
settlers and trade, become a haven for privateers or banditry,
or tempted Britain as a possible base for operations against the
United States. The army prevented local filibusters like Reuben
Kemper and Joseph Kennedy from precipitating further conflict
with Spain, while deterring Spanish officials from any attempt to
retake West Florida. In either case Britain was denied pretexts
for intervention, and large-scale bloodshed was averted. Despite
their desire for territorial expansion and greater national power,
the officers who led the American occupation ultimately served
national interests and international harmony as peacekeepers in
the imperial borderlands between New Orleans and Pensacola.
Domestic and international law and order, American territorial
expansion, and national security came together in the extension
and consolidation of U.S. national sovereignty. That sovereignty
could not be extended or consolidated legitimately by filibusters,
or by militia, prone to marauding and almost indistinguishable
from filibusters. One of the most fundamental attributes of
national sovereignty, in international custom and practical matters
of law and order, is a monopoly, as far as can be established, over
the legitimate use oflarge-scale violence. U.S. Army officers could
reconcile national security and territorial expansion with domestic
and international stability by restraining armed non-state actorsfilibusters and brigands-while intimidating Spain. Neither fullbore expansionists nor strict enforcers of international law, they
were nevertheless the most effective peacekeepers present in West
Florida during the upheavals of 1810 and 1811. Perhaps Harry
Toulmin, the American official most committed to upholding law
and order without resorting to "base intrigue," obfuscation, or
manipulation, put it best. Though he expressed "considerable
anxiety" about the military's conduct when "in feeble hands"
like Sparks's-over whom the filibusters "gained a perfect
ascendancy"-the judge credited Thomas Cushing with directing

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol92/iss1/5

36

Wilson: Conquerors, Peacekeepers, or Both? The U.S. Army and West Florida

CONQUERORS, PEACEKEEPERS, OR BOTH?

105

"the military power" "sole[l]y to the honour and interests of the
nation." Lamenting that the colonel had been called away to
answer Hampton's charges, Toulmin concluded that "the authority
given to governor Claiborne, instead of ... extinguish [ing] illegal
enterprise [filibustering], has only given a new direction to it[.] ...
[NJ othing probably but the timely ... arrival of Col. Cushing with
a competent force, has really saved this country from becoming a
scene of plunder and desolation." 37

37.

Toulmin to Madison,January 10, February 27, and March 6, PJM, 3: 111, 192,
202.

Published by STARS, 2013

37

